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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Arturo Salinas appeals from the judgment of dismissal entered upon the
district court's order summarily dismissing his petition for post-conviction relief.

Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings
The district court summarized the facts of Salinas' underlying criminal
conviction as follows:
The Petitioner pied guilty [to] Count I, Aggravated Battery,
Felony, and Count II, Use of a Deadly Weapon in the Commission
of a Crime, Felony, on September 15, 2011. The Petitioner
entered into a plea agreement with the State to limit its sentencing
recommendation to ten years determinate and ten years
indeterminate for a total unified sentence of twenty years. The
Petitioner was sentenced on November 10, 2011 for Count I as
enhanced by Count II to five years determinate and fifteen years
indeterminate for a total unified sentence of twenty years. Also, as
part of the plea agreement, another felony case, CR-FE-201110039, was dismissed and no Persistent Violator enhancement
was filed. The Petitioner swore to and signed a Written Plea of
Guilty as part of the plea proceeding and the court has taken
judicial notice of the written Guilty Plea Advisory filed in Ada County
Case No. CR-FE-2011-11897. The Judgment and Commitment
was filed November 15, 2011.
The Petitioner moved for reduction of his sentence pursuant
to Idaho Criminal Rule 35 which was denied on December 7, 2011.
(R., pp.128-129 (capitalization original).)

Salinas filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief alleging (1) the
court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to sentence him "in violation of the double
jeopardy clause"; (2) his sentence "violates double jeopa,rdy"; (3) ineffective
assistance of counsel; and (4) a due process violation resulting from the state's
dismissal of certain charges "after seeking a third extension of time for a

1

preliminary hearing" and then "refil[ing] those charges at a later time." (R., pp.45.) Salinas also filed a memorandum in support of his petition (R., pp.8-21) and
a request for counsel (R., pp.37-39).
The court granted Salina's request for counsel "as to allegation 8(d) of the
Petition," which allegation alleged counsel was ineffective for failing to "file an
appeal of the sentence imposed" and failing to "even speak to [Salinas]
regarding the possibility of filing an appeal of the sentence imposed." (R., pp.67, 43 (emphasis omitted).)

The court entered a notice of intent to dismiss

("Notice") Salinas' remaining claims. (R., pp.45-56.) The state filed an answer
and also filed a motion for summary dismissal, including dismissal of allegation
8(d).

(R., pp.58-66, 70-72.)

In addition, the state asked the court to "take

judicial notice of the written guilty plea form and the plea colloquy from
September 15, 2012 in case number CR-FE-2011-0011897, as well as the
presentence report." 1 (R., p.68 (footnote omitted).)

Regarding Salinas' claim

relating to counsel's failure to file an appeal, the state asserted:

(1) he "was

advised by the Court at the time of sentencing about his right to appeal" and,
"[t]herefore, he was aware of the possibility"; (2) Salinas "does not allege that he
requested an appeal" but instead claims "his attorney never spoke on the
subject"; and (3) "[i]n the absence of a request by the petitioner, the State is
unaware of any obligation for trial counsel. This is particularly true, when the

1

The court later took judicial notice of "the audio transcript of the September 15,
2011 plea hearing; audio transcript of the November 10, 2011 sentencing
hearing; the Guilty Plea Advisory form filed September 15, 2011 in CR-FE 1111897; and the presentence report" and ordered preparation of a transcript of the
guilty plea hearing. (R., pp.94, 97.)
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petitioner was advised by the Court of his right to appeal and informed that
counsel would be appointed if he wished to pursue an appeal." (R., pp.64-65.)
Salinas filed a prose response to the court's Notice (R., pp.75-82) and the
state's motion (R., pp.86-93).

Addressing the state's argument regarding

counsel's failure to file an appeal, Salinas "point[ed] the Court and the State of
Idaho" to several cases regarding counsel's obligation to consult with his client
regarding an appeal and to file an appeal if requested. (R., pp.90-91.) Salinas
then reasserted his allegation that counsel did not "speak to [him] about filing an
appeal." (R., p.91.) Salinas' response included an "Oath of Petitioner" stating
his belief that the contents of the response were "true and correct." (R., p.93.)
The court granted partial summary dismissal, dismissing all allegations
with the exception of 8(d). (R., pp.99-109.) Following the court's order of partial
summary dismissal, Salinas, through counsel, filed an "Affidavit in Support of
Petitioner's Objection to Respondent's Motion to Dismiss Allegation Regarding
Appeal" (hereafter "Affidavit") that reads:
I, Arturo Salinas, (hereinafter Petitioner) being first duly sworn on
oath, deposes and states:
1. I was represented by the Public Defender's Office at the District
Court Level;
2. Immediately after my sentencing hearing I asked my attorney to
appeal and file a motion to reduce my sentences.
(R., p.116 (capitalization original).)

The Affidavit is signed by Salinas and

notarized. (Id.)
Two weeks after Salinas filed his Affidavit, the state filed a "Supplemental
Motion for Summary Dismissal" (hereafter "Supplemental Motion"). (R., pp.122-
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124.) The state also filed an affidavit from Craig Steveley, who represented
Salinas in his underlying criminal case.

(R., p.126.)

According to Steveley's

affidavit, "four days after his sentencing, [Salinas] contacted the Public
Defender's officer [sic] and wanted Mr. Steveley to file a motion pursuant to Rule
35" and "Mr. Stevely did so."

(R., p.126.)

Steveley's affidavit further avers

Salinas "never contacted Mr. Steveley again and never requested an appeal."
(R., p.126.)

The affidavit does not address whether Steveley consulted with

Salinas regarding an appeal. (See R., p.126.)
In its Supplemental Motion, the state argued that "counsel had no
affirmative obligation to raise the issue of an appeal with [Salinas]," and noted
the terms of the plea agreement, the sentence imposed, and the fact that the
court advised Salinas of his right to appeal.

(R., p.123.)

The state cited the

following examples from Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470 (2000), in support
of its position:
We cannot say, as a constitutional matter, that in every case
counsel's failure to consult with the defendant about an appeal is
necessarily unreasonable, and therefore deficient. Such a holding
would be inconsistent with both our decision in Strickland and
common sense. For example, suppose that a defendant consults
with counsel; counsel advises the defendant that a guilty plea
probably will lead to a 2 year sentence; the defendant expresses
satisfaction and pleads guilty; the court sentences the defendant to
2 years' imprisonment as expected and informs the defendant of
his appeal rights; the defendant does not express any interest in
appealing, and counsel concludes that there are no nonfrivolous
grounds for appeal. Under these circumstances, it would be
difficult to say that counsel is "professionally unreasonable," as a
constitutional matter, in not consulting with such a defendant
regarding an appeal. Or, for example, suppose a sentencing
court's instructions to a defendant about his appeal rights in a
particular case are so clear and informative as to substitute for
counsel's duty to consult. In some cases, counsel might then
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reasonably decide that he need not repeat that information. We
therefore reject a bright-line rule that counsel must always consult
with the defendant regarding an appeal.
(R., p.123 (quoting Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. at 479-480 (emphasis original,

internal citations omitted).)
Addressing Salinas' Affidavit, the state asserted that Salinas' claim, that
"[i]mmediately after [his] sentencing hearing [he] asked [his] attorney to appeal
and file a motion to reduce [his] sentence" (R., p.116), "if true, would have been
present in the initial pleadings on this matter" (R., p.124).

The state further

argued:
Their conspicuous absence from [Salinas'] initial filings is
noteworthy. So too is the fact that this statement is in direct
contrast to his claim that counsel simply never spoke to the issue of
an appeal. It is counter-intuitive to believe that Mr. Salinas would
not have included reference to his request for an appeal in the
petition. Therefore, the new affidavit by Mr. Salinas should be
given no weight.
Further, Mr. Salinas's first comment on the issue is much
more in keeping with Mr. Steveley's sworn affidavit . . .. Mr. Stevely
[sic] indicates that Mr. Saliinas never asked for an appeal. Mr.
Salinas did reach out to the PD's office and requested a Motion
pursuant to Rule 35, which was filed on his behalf.
. . . When taken together with all of the other materials, Mr.
Salinas's second affidavit can be seen to be disingenuous. Thus,
dismissal is appropriate and the State requests the same.
(R., p.124.)

At the hearing on the state's request for summary dismissal, the court
inquired whether post-conviction counsel wanted the court to consider Salinas'
Affidavit "for purposes of th[e] hearing."

(Tr., p.5, Ls.20-25.)

Counsel

responded, "Most certainly I do." (Tr., p.8, L. 1.) The court also inquired whether
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the prosecutor wanted the court to consider the state's Supplemental Motion and
Steveley's Affidavit, and the prosecutor said she did.

(Tr., p.8, Ls.2-7.)

The

court heard argument and took the matter under advisement. (See generally Tr.,
pp.9-15.)
The district court issued a Memorandum Decision and Order Granting
Respondent's Motion for Summary Dismissal (hereafter "Decision") and entered
a separate Judgment dismissing Salinas' petition with prejudice.

(R., pp.128-

136.) Salinas filed a timely notice of appeal. (R., pp.138-139.) On appeal, the
state filed a motion to remand, which the Court denied in an order directing the
state to "address the issue in its briefing " (Motion for Remand and Statement in
Support

filed April 8, 2014; Order Denying Motion for Remand, filed

May 12, 2014.)
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ISSUES

Salinas states the issue on appeal as:
1) Did the district court err in dismissing Mr. Salinas' petition for
post-conviction relief without conducting an evidentiary hearing
on his claim that he received ineffective assistance of counsel
when his attorney failed to file an appeal on his behalf and
failed to consult with him about an appeal?
2) Did the district court err when it failed to find that Mr. Salinas
submitted admissible evidence for consideration of his claims?
3) Did the district court err in summarily dismissing Mr. Salinas'
post-conviction claims on grounds for he was given no prior
notice?
(Appellant's Brief, p.5.)
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ARGUMENT

A.

Introduction
Salinas contends (1) "the district court erred when it summarily dismissed

his claims that he received ineffective assistance of counsel when his attorney
failed to file an appeal on his behalf and failed to consult with him about an
appeal" since the competing affidavits created a genuine issue of material fact,
and (2) he did not receive the requisite notice that his claim could be dismissed
because his affidavit was not properly notarized. (Appellant's Brief, pp.6-24.)

B.

Standard Of Review
On appeal from summary dismissal of a post-conviction petition, the

appellate court reviews the record to determine if a genuine issue of material fact
exists, which, if resolved in the applicant's favor, would entitle the applicant to the
requested relief. Matthews v. State, 122 Idaho 801, 807, 839 P.2d 1215, 1221
(1992); Aeschliman v. State, 132 Idaho 397, 403, 973 P.2d 749, 755 (Ct. App.
1999). Appellate courts freely review whether a genuine issue of material fact
exists. Edwards v. Conchemco, Inc., 111 Idaho 851,852, 727 P.2d 1279, 1280
(Ct. App. 1986).

C.

Summary Dismissal Standards
"To withstand summary dismissal, a post-conviction applicant must

present evidence establishing a prima facie case as to each element of the
claims upon which the applicant bears the burden of proof." State v. Lovelace,
140 Idaho 53, 72, 90 P.3d 278, 297 (2003) (citing Pratt v. State, 134 Idaho 581,
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583, 6 P.3d 831, 833 (2000)). Thus, a claim for post-conviction relief is subject
to summary dismissal "if the applicant's evidence raises no genuine issue of
material fact" as to each element of the petitioner's claims. Workman v. State,
144 Idaho 518, 522, 164 P.3d 798, 802 (2007) (citing I.C. § 19-4906(b), (c));
Lovelace, 140 Idaho at 72, 90 P.3d at 297. Conflicting statements in affidavits
submitted by the parties are generally sufficient to create a genuine issue of
material fact.

See Banner Life Ins. Co. v. Mark Wallace Dixson Irrevocable

Trust, 147 Idaho 117, 127, 206 P.3d 481, 491 (2009).
In order to establish a prima facie claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel,

a

post-conviction

petitioner

must

demonstrate

both

deficient

performance and resulting prejudice. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,
687-88 (1984); State v. Charboneau, 116 Idaho 129, 137, 774 P.2d 299, 307
(1989).

A claim that trial counsel failed to file a direct appeal despite explicit

instructions by the defendant that he or she do so is a cognizable ineffective
assistance of counsel claim:

"Where a criminal defendant advises his or her

attorney of a desire to appeal, and the attorney fails to take the necessary steps
to file an appeal, such a defendant has been denied his or her constitutional right
to the effective assistance of counsel at a critical stage in the proceedings."
Beasley v. State, 126 Idaho 356, 360, 883 P.2d 714, 718 (Ct. App. 1994); see
also Hoffman v. State, _

Idaho _ , 277 P.3d 1050, 1060 (Ct. App. 2012)

(citing Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 478 (2000)) ("If counsel has
consulted with the defendant, then counsel performs in a professionally
unreasonable manner only by failing to follow the defendant's express
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instructions with regard to an appeal."). To withstand summary dismissal of a
claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to follow instructions to file a notice
of appeal, a post-conviction petitioner must allege facts that, if true, show the
request was made within the requisite time for filing a notice of appeal. Hoffman,
_

Idaho at _ , 277 P.3d at 1060 (summarily dismissing claim that counsel

was ineffective for failing to file notice of appeal where none of the evidence
presented by Hoffman demonstrated that he requested his attorney "to file an
appeal within the requisite time period").
"[W]here a trial court dismisses a claim based upon grounds other than
those offered-by the State's motion for summary dismissal, and accompanying
memoranda-the defendant seeking post-conviction relief must be provided with
a 20-day notice period." Kelly v. State, 149 Idaho 517, 523, 236 P.3d 1277,
1283 (2010). If "the dismissal is based upon the grounds offered by the State,
additional notice is unnecessary."

D.

kl

Legal Standards Relevant To Claim 8(d) And The Court's Decision
When a defendant asks his attorney to file an appeal and his attorney fails

to do so, the attorney is deficient and prejudice will be presumed. Flores-Ortega,
528 U.S. at 484; Gosch v. State, 154 Idaho 71, 294 P.3d 197 (Ct. App. 2012).
Absent a specific instruction to appeal (or not appeal), counsel may still have a
duty to consult with his client about the right to appeal. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S.
at 478. The term "consult," in this context, means "advising the defendant about
the advantages and disadvantages of taking an appeal, and making a
reasonable effort to discover the defendant's wishes."
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Counsel has a duty to

consult in two circumstances: (1) if a "rational defendant would want to appeal
(for example, because there are nonfrivolous grounds for appeal)," or (2) the
defendant "reasonably demonstrated to counsel that he was interested in
appealing."

lfL.

at 480.

"In making this determination, courts must take into

account all the information counsel knew or should have known."

kL.

Whether

the defendant pied guilty, which limits the number of appealable issues and may
reflect a defendant's desire to conclude the proceedings, is "highly relevant" but
"not determinative."

lfL.

However, even where a defendant pleads guilty, "the

court must consider such factors as whether the defendant received the
sentence bargained for as part of the plea and whether the plea expressly
reserved or waived some or all appeal rights."

kL.

To show prejudice in relation to a claim that counsel was deficient for
failing to consult with the defendant regarding an appeal, the defendant must
demonstrate that, had counsel consulted with him, he would have appealed.
Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. at 485. The existence of nonfrivolous grounds for an
appeal informs this inquiry but "a defendant's inability to specify the points he
would raise were his right to appeal reinstated will not foreclose the possibility
that he can satisfy the prejudice requirement where there are other substantial
reasons to believe that he would have appealed."

lfL.

(quotations and citation

omitted).
In its Decision, the district court stated:
Petitioner claims in his pro se petition in allegation 8(d) that
trial counsel was ineffective because counsel "did not seek to file
an appeal of the sentenced [sic] imposed; nor did he even speak to
[the Petitioner] regarding the possibility of filing an appeal of the
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sentence imposed." The Petitioner did not file an affidavit with his
petition to support his conclusory allegation. However, with the
assistance of counsel, the Petitioner filed a document titled an
affidavit that alleged the Petitioner spoke with trial counsel and
requested he file an appeal. However, again that document was
not sworn as affirmatively true and correct. Although it says it was
sworn, there was no oath or affirmative statement before the notary
... just a notary's signature. Therefore, this statement also does
not constitute an affidavit in Idaho and is not considered as
admissible evidence.
Taking the pleadings as true for purposes of this summary
disposition motion, the Petitioner never spoke with his counsel and
requested he file an appeal. The affidavit filed by the State
confirms that the Petitioner did not request his counsel file an
appeal. Petitioner presents no admissible evidence to establish
that he tried to speak with counsel about an appeal, whether he
directed counsel to appeal, or on what grounds he wanted counsel
to file an appeal. Moreover, Petitioner does not offer evidence that
counsel knew Petitioner would want to appeal or that Petitioner
"reasonab[y] demonstrated to counsel that he was interested in
appealing." Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 480, 120 S.Ct.
1029, 1036, 145 L.Ed. 2d 985 (2000). This Court will not accept
Petitioner's conclusory allegation without admissible evidence.
Roman, supra. Petitioner has failed to create a genuine issue of
material fact that his counsel was ineffective by not filing an appeal.
(R., p.133 (brackets original, ellipse original, footnotes omitted).)

As an alternative, the court concluded:
Even if the document filed by Petitioner on February 7, 2013
was sworn as affirmatively true and correct, the court will have
sworn statements by the Petitioner that are inapposite of whether
or not the Petitioner requested an appeal of his trial counsel. The
Petitioner still has not met his burden of establishing: (1) a material
issue of fact exists as to whether counsel's performance was
deficient; and (2) a material issue of fact exists as to whether
deficiency prejudiced petitioner's case.
The court has not
presumed error in this case because the Petitioner has not met his
burden of showing that Petitioner requested an appeal and that
counsel refused to file an appeal or that the appeal would not have
been frivolous.
(R., p.134 (citations omitted).)
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The state submits this case for decision on the record.
DATED this 2ih day of May 2014.

JESs.10 M. LORELLO
DJ~ Attorney General

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 2ih day of May 2014, served a true
and correct copy of the attached BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by causing a copy
addressed to:
DIANE M. WALKER
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
to be placed in The State Appellate Public Defender's basket located in the
Idaho Supreme Court Clerk's office.

Deput~ Attorney General
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